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ABSTRACT
This article traces the complex intellectual path of Olivier Blanchard,
a personification of the controversial evolution of macroeconomic
research over the last three decades. After contributing to
consolidation of the core of mainstream macroeconomics,
Blanchard recently suggested ‘rethinking’ some of its key aspects
to take stock of the lessons of the 2008 Great Recession, which he
witnessed as the International Monetary Fund’s Chief Economist.
This welcome discussion, which according to Blanchard should
open mainstream macroeconomics to heterodox thinking, has so
far produced a certainly interesting albeit theoretically
contradictory synthesis and limited policy consequences. The
most paradigmatic aspect of this rethinking of macroeconomics is
represented by the abandonment in teaching of aggregate supply
and demand in favor of a revival of the IS–LM model
complemented by the Phillips curve. While this change of
perspective does allow for the instability of ‘natural’ equilibrium to
be emphasized, a deeper reading may prove incompatible with
the neoclassical foundations of the mainstream approach.
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1. Introduction
Although it did not lead to a revolution of ideas in economic theory, the 2008 Great Reces-
sion (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2012) did generate an interesting debate among
the representatives of the mainstream approach to macroeconomics (for a definition of
‘mainstream’, see Brancaccio 2011). Some economists, who for years have moved along
the groove of the prevailing paradigm, today show a growing intolerance of its heuristic
capabilities. An influential thesis, among them, is that standard macroeconomic models
have failed according to all the most important tests of scientific theory: they did not
predict that the financial crisis would happen, and then they understated its effects (Stiglitz
2011).
Other scholars, however, suggest that the mainstream approach to macroeconomics
already addresses the typical failures of a market economy as the causes of instability
and recession: economists should therefore be able to correct forecasting errors and
suggest solutions to the crisis by drawing on existing studies in the dominant literature
(Tabellini 2009). According to this view, it is not necessary to disrupt what Olivier
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Blanchard calls the ‘core’ of mainstream macroeconomic theory, and hence there is no
need to rewrite the textbooks on which that core is based (Blanchard 2000; Blanchard,
Amighini, and Giavazzi 2010).
The debate that has developed among the representatives of the mainstream approach
has several areas of interest. The discussion, albeit often contradictory, ranges between
attempts to dismantle some theoretical pillars of the prevailing paradigm, and strenuous
defense of its supporting structure. One way to explore this debate is to examine critically
the intellectual path of Olivier Blanchard, the mainstream economist who maybe more
than any other colleague stood at the crossroads of the frontier of academic research,
the teaching of macroeconomics and the implementation of macroeconomic policies.
Recent twists in Blanchard’s thought, as we shall see, highlight some limitations concern-
ing the effective possibilities of the evolution of the dominant approach in macroeco-
nomics, and the related opportunity to revitalize a fruitful debate with alternative
schools of economic thought.
2. Building the ‘core’ of mainstream macroeconomics
‘In 1968, like many students of my generation, I wanted to change the world … and I
thought that, of the social sciences, economics was the discipline most likely to be directly
useful’ (Blanchard 2014). With these words, Blanchard recalled his decision to study econ-
omics at the University of Paris Dauphine. A few decades later, Blanchard is undoubtedly
among the most cited and influential economists who actively participate in research,
teaching and current debates. Whether his original objectives were achieved is more con-
testable. His prolific research activity has rarely passed the boundaries of the mainstream
approach to economic theory: a view that has undoubtedly shaped economic policies and
the evolution of our societies over the past four decades, but possibly in a direction differ-
ent from that envisaged by Blanchard in his youth.
Born in 1948 in Amiens, France, Blanchard obtained his PhD at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston, United States after undergraduate studies in
Paris. After a period of teaching at Harvard University, he returned to MIT in 1982.
The more than 100 papers he has published in academic journals span various fields of
contemporary economics, such as the instability of financial markets, the determinants
of unemployment, the functioning of monetary and fiscal policies, and the transition of
former socialist countries to market economies. Blanchard also wrote two textbooks
that have been translated into several languages and adopted in hundreds of graduate
and undergraduate curricula worldwide: Lectures on Macroeconomics, written with
Stanley Fischer, an advanced textbook that has informed several generations of graduate
students (Blanchard and Fischer 1989); and Macroeconomics, an intermediate manual
whose European version has been written in collaboration with Alessia Amighini and
Francesco Giavazzi (Blanchard 2000, 2017; Blanchard, Amighini, and Giavazzi 2010,
2018).
Over the years, Blanchard has contributed significantly to the building of a con-
sensus around mainstream economic theory and policy, helping to outline and sys-
tematize what he called the ‘core’ of the prevailing paradigm in macroeconomics
(2000, ch. 30). The key propositions of this core can be summarized in the following
statements.
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First, it is assumed that, in a market economy free of imperfections, rigidities and asym-
metries, all macroeconomic variables are anchored to a Pareto-efficient, full employment
equilibrium determined by the ‘fundamentals’ of the economy: tastes, technological devel-
opment, the existing workforce and the available capital stock. It is also stated, however,
that in the real world the ‘natural’ equilibrium is far from a Pareto-efficient full employ-
ment of resources as a result of asymmetries and imperfections due to several causes,
including social institutions such as the market power of companies and labor unions.
Second, provoking a drop in demand, a crisis can cause temporary deviations of pro-
duction, employment and real wages from their respective natural levels. Market forces
will then spontaneously return the economy to its natural equilibrium: more specifically,
unemployment beyond its natural rate will trigger a decline in nominal wages and prices
so as to support aggregate demand, production and employment recovery. However,
market forces alone may fail to return the economy to equilibrium sufficiently swiftly.
In this case, policy has a role to play. While lags and biases linked to the political
process make the use of fiscal policy problematic, the mainstream approach emphasizes
the capacity of monetary policy to manage aggregate demand in order to speed up the con-
vergence of production and employment to the natural equilibrium.
Third, the main role of economic policy is not the management of aggregate demand
aimed at stabilizing the economy around its natural equilibrium. Rather, the most impor-
tant role of economic policy is the elimination, through so-called ‘structural reforms’, of all
obstacles and rigidities that may prevent the working of free market forces and keep the
natural equilibrium from being Pareto-efficient full employment of labor and other pro-
ductive resources.
It is important to note that the mainstream macroeconomics core to which Blanchard
crucially contributed is closely related to neoclassical economic theory. Blanchard’s
natural equilibrium is a particular version of the typical neo-Walrasian intertemporal
general equilibrium exclusively determined by the so-called ‘fundamentals’ of the
economy: tastes, technological development and the initial endowments of resources
such as the available workforce and capital stock. In an ideal market economy free of
asymmetries and imperfections, when this neoclassical general equilibrium is attained
there is no involuntary unemployment, labor and other factors of production are fully
employed and prices represent indexes of the relative scarcity of goods and factors of pro-
duction in relation to their demands.
It is true that within mainstream macroeconomic models an effective demand crisis
may in fact reduce employment below its maximum level; but this is considered a tempor-
ary phenomenon bound to be reabsorbed once price and wage flexibility is allowed to fully
work. It is also true that the natural equilibrium of mainstream macroeconomics itself,
because of market imperfections, is assumed to be characterized by involuntary unem-
ployment. In the labor market more specifically, asymmetries and rigidities may
prevent wages from reaching the level that corresponds to a full employment neoclassical
general equilibrium, thus measuring the relative scarcity of labor with respect to other
factors of production. But that general equilibrium, for mainstream macroeconomics,
remains the attractor towards which the economy should converge if imperfections and
asymmetries were removed.
In this sense, Blanchard argued that the neoclassical general equilibrium models without
imperfections and their macro versions, such as the Solow and Ramsey models, should not
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necessarily be interpreted as direct representations of reality, but rather as ‘normative’ refer-
ence points towards which the economic system ideally should strive (Blanchard and Fischer
1989, ch. 10). In other circumstances Blanchard went further by using the typical logic of
neoclassical growth models not only for normative purposes but also to suggest analysis,
albeit approximate, of the long-term trends of real economies. An interesting example, in
this sense, is Blanchard’s interpretation of the Soviet political parable. Blanchard (2000)
noted that over 70 years the USSR attained growth rates on average higher than those of
capitalist economies. He added, however, that this result was achieved due to extremely
high rates of investment, which in his opinion should have logically implied, following a
Solowian logic, a contraction in consumption. This was in turn, according to Blanchard,
a possible source of the crisis of political consensus within the Soviet bloc.
The mere possibility of aggregate demand problems, therefore, is insufficient to differ-
entiate current mainstream macroeconomics from the traditional neoclassical paradigm.
Blanchard (2008) has in fact situated today’s dominant approach within the so-called neo-
classical synthesis, which reduces Keynesian effective demand deficiencies to a short-term
case of the neoclassical equilibrium that is considered a simplified version of Hicks’ (1939)
temporary equilibrium models. The neoclassical synthesis also embeds the AS–ADmodel,
a centerpiece, in Blanchard’s view, of teaching macroeconomics.
3. Between critique and defense of mainstream macroeconomics
In light of the earlier discussion, Blanchard must be counted among the leading scholars
involved in the development and consolidation of a ‘consensus’ around a view of macro-
economics anchored in neoclassical economic theory.
We do note, nevertheless, that his relationship with such an intellectual heritage has not
been passive: indeed, Blanchard’s contributions often challenged accepted tradition. A
famous example in his early career is the elaboration of the concept of ‘rational
bubbles’: even under the extreme hypothesis of rational expectations, it is possible to
show that financial markets may be subject to bubbles; that is to say, booms and busts
of asset prices that are completely independent of the so-called fundamentals of the
economy (Blanchard and Watson 1982). At the time, this was considered a heretic con-
clusion and many tried to undermine its importance. But the idea of rational bubbles
was, and still is today, logically inconsistent with the orthodox postulated correspondence
between stock market prices and natural equilibrium capital returns.
In another widely cited contribution, Blanchard (1985) shows how the introduction of
finite horizons in a model populated by otherwise rational and forward-looking agents was
enough to yield non-neutrality of macroeconomic policy: fiscal policy and the time profile
of taxation has an impact on natural equilibrium even without market frictions.
Blanchard later expressed skepticism towards other cornerstones of mainstreammacroeco-
nomics, such as the inverse relationship between interest rates and investment: a relationship
often taken for granted, and yet not supported by robust empirical evidence. As Blanchard
(1986, p. 153) wrote, to make interest rates – or user costs – ‘appear at all in the investment
equation, one has to display more than the usual amount of econometric ingenuity, resorting
most of the time to choosing a specification that simply forces the effect to be there’.
These doubts led him to the brink of a general critique of the mainstream separation
between cyclical fluctuations and long-term natural equilibrium. In a pioneering paper
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written with Larry Summers, Blanchard contemplated the possibility that a demand shock
could cause ‘hysteresis’, that is, a persistent effect on unemployment that could eventually
lead to a permanent deviation from the natural equilibrium (Blanchard and Summers
1986). At the time, the possibility of hysteresis was linked to the action of unions,
which could prevent the wage deflation necessary to restore equilibrium. Later on, Blan-
chard (2006) adopted a more nuanced view about such a mechanism. In the debates about
the bargaining power of unions, labor contract rigidities and the performance of macro-
economic variables, reinforcing the dominant view that more flexible labor contracts cor-
relate with decreases in unemployment, he clearly acknowledged that the two magnitudes
in the empirical literature were broadly uncorrelated (ibid.).
Thus, in many instances Blanchard expressed his disenchantment, sometimes with a
certain irony, with the robustness of the mainstream’s theoretical foundations. These
doubts, nevertheless, were never central to his academic work, and, more importantly,
were never made explicit in his contributions to teaching: in his textbooks, Blanchard
(2000) never questioned the elsewhere reviled relationship between the interest rate and
investment.
Nor did his intellectual doubts lead him to challenge dominant policy conclusions –
rather the contrary. Until recently, Blanchard’s defense of mainstream policy positions
was often ‘radical’. A good case in point is represented by the long-lasting problem of the
external imbalances of the Eurozone countries. Together with Giavazzi, Blanchard
argued that these imbalances were the virtuous symptom of successful economic inte-
gration, theywere beneficial to peripheral countries, and as suchdid not need to be corrected
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). Moreover, when he eventually acknowledged that capital
flows had led to unsustainable external positions in the Eurozone, his policy prescription
was consistent with mainstream recipes: wage and price deflation aimed at restoring com-
petitiveness (Blanchard 2007). At the time, Blanchard did not seem concerned about debt
deflation or other possible perverse effects of a price reduction. This position is all the more
puzzling if one considers that it conflicts with some of his previous works, where he
expressed strong skepticism about the ability of deflationary processes to absorb the imbal-
ances between countries belonging to a monetary union (Blanchard and Katz 1992).
To summarize: at least until the last economic crisis, the exercise of doubt was contained
in the dark corners of the ivory tower of academia; it did not influence the crucial spheres of
teaching and policy-making and did not lead Blanchard to venture beyond the borders of
mainstream economic theory. We could say that Olivier Blanchard wore the clothes of a
mainstream archbishop; a function he fulfilled with a critical sense, and with a certain aris-
tocratic habit of cultivating doubt, but only for the purpose of strengthening the dominant
paradigm. A good example is represented by his ill-timed remarks that, despite some
undeniable theoretical and empirical weaknesses, there was ‘substantial convergence’
around the mainstream approach and the state of macroeconomics was ultimately ‘good’
(Blanchard 2009a, p. 210).
4. The turning point of the ‘Great Recession’
The advent of the recent Great Recession, however, marks a real turning point in Blan-
chard’s thought, and coincides with an important career change: in September 2008 the
French-American economist puts on hold his academic career and replaces Simon
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Johnson as the head of the IMF’s Research Department. This happens at a crucial time,
just a few days before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the beginning of the inter-
national economic crisis.
The recession is harsh, and many commentators highlight similarities with the 1930s
Great Depression. The crisis challenges the mainstream consensus precisely when Blan-
chard moves from an academic position to one in which the theoretical apparatus is con-
tinually tested through its policy applications. It is therefore in this position that Blanchard
can more easily assess whether his work has succeeded in changing the world as he aimed
to do in 1968.
In his new function as the IMF’s Chief Economist, Blanchard immediately speaks with
two voices: one which argues, albeit in passing, that ‘fiscal policy has to play a central role
here. At the time of this writing, most countries are developing fiscal packages, intended at
increasing demand directly and decreasing the perceived risk of another Great Depression’
(Blanchard 2009b, p. 19); and another in which he refers to the need for a ‘temporary
increase in public sector employment associated with some of the new programs and pol-
icies’ (Spilimbergo et al. 2008, p. 5).
This is the beginning of a long series of public interventions, among which one can cite
the well-known paper written with Daniel Leigh, where they argue that the underestima-
tion of the crisis by the IMF and other forecasting institutions may have been caused by
excessively low estimates of the Keynesian multiplier of autonomous expenditure (IMF
2012, p. 41; Blanchard and Leigh 2013). However, macroeconomic policy is not the
only area in which Blanchard has suggested ‘innovations’. His proposals have also influ-
enced the issue of the institutions that regulate markets, such as those relating to the recov-
ery of capital controls (Blanchard 2016c).
Olivier Blanchard seems to have also had a profound impact on the policies of the IMF.
As soon as he arrives inWashington, and with the approval of the then-IMF head, Domin-
ique Strauss-Kahn, Blanchard tries to raise the IMF’s awareness of the severity of the crisis,
and he encourages the staff to think beyond traditional policy responses. His task is, of
course, made easier by the exceptional situation of the international economy. Even
before his arrival, the October 2008 World Economic Outlook (WEO) contained a
section devoted to discretionary fiscal policies that cautiously suggested these could be
used to fight the downturn (IMF 2008a).
Blanchard further pushes in this direction, and the November WEO update (IMF
2008b) explicitly calls for expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, even if limited to
countries having some – although not precisely defined – ‘fiscal space’. The French econ-
omist is also credited with the publication of the already mentioned IMF’s ‘mea culpa’ on
the underestimation of fiscal multipliers. Even more importantly, under his lead the IMF
widens its research scope to encompass a number of issues that, in the corridors of the
institution, many still consider heretic. For example: the possibility that deficit-financed
public investment results in long-run growth and eventually in a reduction of debt
ratios (IMF 2014); or the recognition that, in some instances, the free movement of
capital may do more harm than good (IMF 2013); or, again, recognizing that a link
may exist between rising inequality and lower economic growth. This latter topic
illustrates the impact of ‘Blanchard’s method’ on the IMF’s work. The IMF had already
certified, before the arrival of the French economist, the overall increase in inequality
(IMF 2007). It is only under the compulsion of Blanchard that the IMF walks the extra
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mile and promotes more general thinking about the interaction between greater inequality
and lower growth, which in turn leads to the somewhat unorthodox conclusion that
income distribution may have an impact on efficiency and growth (IMF/ILO 2009;
Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014).
Blanchard’s influence on the IMF is not limited to the debate about economic policy.
He actively works to open channels of communication between the world of public
policy and the frontiers of academic research. This leads, in March 2011, to the first
of a series of conferences titled ‘Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy’, with the partici-
pation of many of the leading exponents of contemporary mainstream economic analy-
sis. The event is preceded by a document in which Blanchard and others list some
limitations of mainstream pre-crisis thinking, including the excessive confidence in
market-based regulation of the financial system, and a dangerous underestimation of
the potential recessionary impact of deflationary policies (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and
Mauro 2010).
5. ‘As a result of the crisis, a hundred intellectual flowers are blooming’
How far can Olivier Blanchard go in his ‘rethinking’ of mainstream economic policy? To
answer this question, it is worthwhile examining an interview that he released in August
2015, just a few weeks before the end of his tenure as the IMF’s Chief Economist. Para-
phrasing the famous Maoist exhortation to competition among schools of thought, Blan-
chard declares that
As a result of the crisis, a hundred intellectual flowers are blooming. Some are very old
flowers: Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Kaldorian models of growth and
inequality. Some propositions that would have been considered anathema in the past are
being proposed by ‘serious’ economists: For example, monetary financing of the fiscal
deficit. Some fundamental assumptions are being challenged, for example the clean separ-
ation between cycles and trends: Hysteresis is making a comeback. Some of the econometric
tools, based on a vision of the world as being stationary around a trend, are being challenged.
(IMF 2015)
Beyond the allusion to the ‘seriousness’ of mainstream economists, this signals a signiﬁ-
cant change of direction. In his textbook accounts of the history of economic thought,
Blanchard does not mention ‘critical’ thinkers (see, for example, Blanchard 2000, ch.
30). The fact that he cites now ‘heretics’ like Kaldor and Minsky as sources of inspiration
for the further development of economic ideas represents a signiﬁcant innovation, not
only for research but also for teaching.
However, on closer inspection, this new attention to non-mainstream thinkers is not
very surprising. Even when praising the emergence of a consensus around mainstream
macroeconomics, Blanchard (2009a, p. 225) had already complained about the risk of
‘too much convergence’ among economists. His focus of attention on the recent revival
of alternative approaches could thus be read as the wish for the economic crisis to initiate
a fruitful Lakatosian dispute between paradigms. It should be clear, however, that if such a
dispute were to really begin, it would be foolish to imagine a change of ‘side’ by Blanchard.
From his intellectual trajectory it is hard to infer that this French economist is on the verge
of a conversion to an alternative paradigm. Blanchard’s critiques of the mainstream have
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always carefully remained ‘internal’, avoiding radical departures from the intellectual fra-
mework to which he contributed.
A good example is the unprecedented IMF’s mea culpa on the size of multipliers and
the related economic forecasts. To those fearing for the institution’s loss of credibility,
Blanchard replied that the error stemmed from a correct processing of insufficient avail-
able data, and that the revision was not due to the acknowledgment of methodological or
theoretical errors but rather to the availability of new evidence (IMF Survey 2015). This
explanation is questionable, especially if we consider that for several years the IMF has
widely used models that, for theoretical reasons and not the availability of data, denied
the existence of the multiplier of autonomous expenditure or at least greatly downplayed
its relevance (Bayoumi 2004).
Perhaps even more telling is Blanchard’s interpretation of the Greek economic crisis.
From 2009 to 2015, under the direction of the IMF, of the European Commission (EC)
and of the European Central Bank (ECB) – the so-called Troika – Greece implemented
an unprecedented deflationary policy, which led to a 15 percent fall in the average
nominal wage and a 30 percent fall in nominal public spending.1 Blanchard defended
the adjustment program even beyond what would have been expected of the Chief Econ-
omist of one of the institutions promoting these policies. Somewhat at odds with the IMF’s
own research findings, he suggested on several occasions that such a program was fit to
some extent for Greece and maybe even other peripheral Eurozone countries (Blanchard
2012, 2015). Once again, he overlooked a risk that had been highlighted by many leading
scholars and even in his own work: prolonged deflation could plunge the economy into a
state of permanent distress, thus endangering the very debt sustainability that austerity is
meant to achieve (AA.VV 2013; Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers 2015).
In fact, the crisis led a number of scholars, who, like Blanchard, have contributed to the
consolidation of the mainstream consensus, to question a major building block of main-
stream macroeconomics: the separation between short-term cycles, mostly demand-
driven, and a long-term natural equilibrium. This separation is inherited from the
Walrasian tradition; it was central in the monetarist view, and eventually percolated in
the DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) literature. Interestingly enough, it
was also de facto accepted by the Keynesian theory of the 1950s (and by its modern cham-
pions; for example, see Krugman 2011) whose IS–LM (investment-savings–liquidity-
money) apparatus was typically framed within a short-term horizon. DeLong and
Summers (2012) and Fatas and Summers (2015), among others, have developed theoretical
and empirical arguments against the separation between cycle and long-term natural equi-
librium. Hysteresis and (human as well as physical) capital destruction are the reasons that
economic depressions have a permanent impact on potential output. These results have
been somewhat neglected by Blanchard, who recently (2016b) reassessed his faith in
DSGE models as being flexible enough to accommodate the new insights gained from the
Great Recession. This neglect is all the more puzzling in that, first, establishing a link
between the short and long run has important consequences for the conduct of macroeco-
nomic policies, which can have a (positive or negative) impact on the long-term position of
the economy; and, second, within this ‘anomalous’ mainstream research stream a
1European Commission AMECO database (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/
economic-databases/macro-economic-database-ameco_en).
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paramount role is played by hysteresis, which, as we saw above, was first introduced in a
macroeconomic framework by Blanchard himself (Blanchard and Summers 1986).
The fact that so often Blanchard seems to contradict himself, especially on the real
effects of monetary wage and price deflation, is in some ways emblematic. The difficulty
of analyzing the link between deflation and crisis seems to be typical of the approach of
mainstream economics. An immediate explanation of this may be traced to the fact
that denying price adjustments are able to solve a crisis leads to questioning of the unique-
ness, stability and even existence of the natural equilibrium in standard macroeconomic
models. On second thoughts, however, the problem may go beyond the borders of macro-
economics. The deflation of money prices in the presence of high unemployment is in fact
one of the typical mechanisms of a market economy. Questioning its effectiveness may
lead to a more general skepticism regarding the overall ability of so-called spontaneous
market forces to govern the economic system. Doubts about deflation, in other words,
could be seen as a Trojan horse for a general critique of the capacity of a market
economy to determine prices that guarantee optimal allocation of existing resources
both in static and dynamic scenarios. For this reason, too, they could elicit further dilem-
mas and inconsistencies within mainstream economic debate.
6. The repudiation of the AS–AD model: A point of no return?
The tortuous, non-linear and sometimes contradictory evolution of Olivier Blanchard’s
thoughts maybe meets its precipitation point in the crucial context of teaching, where
different paradigms fight a battle for hegemony.
We have already noted that the AS–AD (aggregate demand–aggregate supply) model
can be considered an upgraded version of the so-called neoclassical synthesis: in this
sense, while admitting temporary deviations of aggregate demand from the natural equi-
librium, the model must still be placed in the neoclassical research tradition. However,
unlike other versions of the same model (Mankiw 2010; Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore
2014), Blanchard’s AS–AD scheme has a very important peculiarity: it is based on the
hypothesis that the mark-up and related distribution between wages and profits are
exogenous and not related to employment levels (Blanchard 2000; Blanchard, Amighini,
and Giavazzi 2010). This assumption seems in contradiction to neoclassical theory: in a
sense, it could be considered an implicit openness to heterodox theories of income distri-
bution that drop the determination of the real wage and the rate of profit from the respect-
ive marginal productivities of labor and capital; that is, from the neoclassical fundamentals
of the scarcity of resources and the preferences of economic agents. Also in the field of
teaching, Blanchard seems to want to be on the borderline between the mainstream
approach and the competing paradigms.
There are, in fact, several ways in which Blanchard’s assumption of a mark-up unre-
lated to employment can be made consistent with the foundations of neoclassical econ-
omic theory (Blanchard and Fischer 1989). For example, in a context of monopolistic
competition, it is possible to assume a constant demand elasticity to prices; in this case,
changes in the level of economic activity, employment and related wage claims have no
effect on mark-up and income distribution. In such a context, it is the constant mark-
up, together with the function of the real wage set as a result of bargaining between
firms and workers, which contribute to the determination of the natural level of
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employment; namely, the level that does not generate an instability of wages and prices.
This solution, however, must be considered a special case. When the specific hypotheses
on the market regime and constant elasticity are removed, the economic system will return
to a neoclassical competitive general equilibrium where prices, income distribution and
then the mark-up move according to the relative scarcity of the factors of productions
with respect to their demands. The neoclassical equilibrium, once again, has to be con-
sidered as the center of gravity for Blanchard’s AS–AD analysis.
It is important to note, however, that more recently the judgment of Blanchard on the
AS–AD model has changed radically. According to Blanchard, the main point of this
scheme
is to show how output naturally returns to potential with no change in policy, through a
mechanism that appears marginally relevant in practice: lower output leads to a lower
price level, which leads, for a given money stock, to a higher real money stock, which
leads to a lower interest rate, which leads to higher demand and higher output. This is a
long, convoluted chain of events with doubtful realism. Central to the adjustment is the
assumption of constancy of the nominal money supply, which again is not the way central
banks do business. And the notion that economies naturally return to normal has not
held up well over the last seven years. (Blanchard 2016a)
As a result, Blanchard (2016a) argues that, ‘the aggregate demand–aggregate supply model
should be eliminated’. This change in perspective led to a series of innovations in the latest
edition of Blanchard’s macroeconomics textbook (2017). The IMF’s former Chief Econ-
omist writes that, ‘the traditional model of demand and aggregate supply was cumbersome
and gave too optimistic a view of the return of output to potential’ (ibid., p. xiii). For this
reason, Blanchard replaces the traditional AS–AD model with an analysis called ‘IS–LM–
PC’, which combines two well-known analytical tools of the last century: the macroeco-
nomic model of Hicks and the Phillips curve. In this scheme the movements of the
wage and price levels do not help to restore the equilibrium, but, on the contrary, may
even create instability problems. It is then up to the central bank to ﬁx the interest rate
to determine a volume of investment and aggregate demand in line with the natural equi-
librium levels of production and employment.
In Blanchard’s ‘new’ view, this different analytical framework ‘gives a simpler and more
accurate description of the role of monetary policy and of output and inflation dynamics’
(ibid.; see also Blanchard, Amighini, and Giavazzi 2018). While attempting to save DSGE
models as a useful reference framework for policy analysis (2016b), Blanchard chooses to
go back, at least in the sphere of teaching, to a framework dating back to before the intel-
lectual ‘counter-revolution’ of Friedman and Lucas (2016a). This is a conclusion that
should be welcomed by Krugman (2016), who seemed to refer precisely to IS–LM-type
frameworks when arguing that the continuing reference to DSGE models comes at the
cost of crowding-out more useful tools for policy analysis.
Thus, after many ‘hesitations’ on the effects of deflation, it seems the die is cast: in the
crucial context of teaching, the Blanchard of today denies that the reduction of wages and
prices will contribute to the achievement of natural equilibrium and he implicitly rejects
the idea of a negative elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to the price level. In his
view, however, this change should not affect the natural equilibrium itself: lack of confi-
dence in the re-balancing capabilities of the spontaneous deflation mechanism should
only concern the stability of the equilibrium and not its existence.
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On closer inspection, however, Blanchard’s new view on deflation has broader impli-
cations for the structure of his model and even undermines the neoclassical foundations
of its natural equilibrium. In fact, as stated above, Blanchard’s peculiar hypothesis of a
mark-up that is exogenous and independent of employment levels can be made consistent
with neoclassical economic theory by assuming monopolistic competition and a constant
demand elasticity for prices. It is clear, however, that this solution, in turn, can occur only
in the case of a negative elasticity of aggregate demand to the price level: an elasticity equal
to or higher than zero increases profit as quantity increases and hence does not allow the
determination of a monopolistic competition equilibrium and a related mark-up (Bran-
caccio 2017). But in Blanchard’s AS–AD model, this means of determining the mark-
up, as noted, is necessary for the same determination of the natural equilibrium. The
removal of the assumption of negative demand elasticity, therefore, will raise a problem
not only of stability but also the existence of natural equilibrium, and, in a sense, will
open a series of questions about the same definition that Blanchard wants to give to the
concept of equilibrium.
In essence, abandoning the idea that deflation can expand demand, Blanchard
implicitly risks losing the possibility of interpreting in neoclassical terms his idea of an
exogenous mark-up and the related natural equilibrium of his model. The collapse of
that neoclassical basis, then, opens the way to the development of alternative versions
of his model, sometimes provocatively defined Anti-Blanchard: according to these, for
example, income distribution can be logically separated from the income level and may
be determined by the political-institutional context and ultimately by the balance of
power between social classes (see Amighini et al. 2012; see also Brancaccio 2017; Brancac-
cio and Suppa 2017).
It is striking to note in this regard, that, while following other pathways, Blanchard’s
analysis arrives at results not too dissimilar from the macroeconomic implications of
the Cambridge critique of the neoclassical theory of capital and its further developments
(Garegnani 1978, 1979; Kurz and Salvadori 1995; Pasinetti 2000; Petri 2004). Well beyond
the author’s intentions, Blanchard’s (2016a) last critique of the AS–AD model may thus
represent an unprecedented climb over the border between paradigms and perhaps
even a point of no return with respect to the accepted tradition.
7. Conclusion
Olivier Blanchard’s intellectual path, exploring different avenues – sometimes non-linear,
sometimes even contradictory – can be considered as the personification of the controver-
sial evolution of mainstream macroeconomic research during the last three decades.
Especially since the Great Recession of 2008, this French economist has engaged in a
debate with his own intellectual roots that has been troubled and filled with doubt. Blan-
chard’s evolution of thought, in this respect, is radically different from the zealous re-prop-
osition of doctrinal dogma that, especially in Europe, still rages in academia and even more
so in policy circles.
Assessing this complex intellectual path, nevertheless, also helps to understand why
Blanchard’s analyses are ultimately limited by the mainstream framework, and by the
role he decided to play in its defense. The primary limitation of the mainstream analysis,
in our view, concerns the neoclassical reliance on price movements as leading the
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economy towards an optimal use of the available amount of labor and other productive
resources. This reliance is also apparent in the old IS–LM diagram, advocated by
Krugman and other members of the mainstream and that Blanchard readmits at least
in the educational field.
In newer versions of the IS–LM model, the hypothesis of an inverse relationship
between interest rate and investment remains crucial to ensure that the economic
system can return to its natural equilibrium thanks to monetary or relative price move-
ments. Of course, according to Blanchard, the movement towards the equilibrium of
that particular price which is the interest rate cannot happen spontaneously, and so it
must be favored by appropriate monetary policy. But this seems to be in the end a
detail, caused by a mere problem of adjustment in price expectations.
This is a typical feature of almost all of the latest evolutions in Blanchard’s thought and
more generally in current mainstream analysis: they fall within the branch of neoclassical
doctrine that several years ago was sharply defined, and cricitized, as imperfectionist
(Eatwell and Milgate 1982). According to this line of research, while in the best of all poss-
ible worlds the spontaneous movement of market prices would bring the economy
towards a neoclassical competitive general equilibrium, actual markets are inhibited
from fulfilling this task by the presence of ‘frictions’, ‘rigidities’, ‘asymmetric information’
or ‘incorrect expectations’ concerning future movements of prices. In fact, the critique of
the neoclassical theory of capital has shown that even if all ‘market imperfections’ were
removed, there would be no guarantee of achieving a full employment equilibrium
simply through spontaneous price movements. In the case of the IS–LM model, for
example, the problem concerns not only adjustments in price expectations but also the
impossibility of proving the existence of an inverse relationship between the interest
rate and investment. The non-existence of this relation, among other things, also causes
a sense of perplexity concerning the confidence that Blanchard and other mainstream
scholars continue to place in the ability of monetary policy to ensure convergence
towards full employment.
The mainstream internal critique will not be enough to address the ambitious task of
‘rethinking economics’. His recent interest in the revival of alternative approaches (IMF
Survey 2015) could be interpreted as the hope of a renewed debate between different
schools of economic thought. There are reasons to believe that the revival of this
debate will help to better delineate the features of some internal aporias to mainstream
macroeconomics and also to make it clear that the most serious among them are due to
its neoclassical base.
We should acknowledge, however, that the difficulties, limitations and contradictions
within mainstream macroeconomics, exemplified by the evolution of Blanchard’s
thoughts, are not sufficient grounds for initiating a Lakatosian dispute between para-
digms. Despite commendable efforts to identify epistemological and theoretical
common denominators (see, among others, Lavoie 2011), the alternative research
lines still appear frayed, split and characterized by insufficient levels of communication
with respect to those developed between the scholars of the dominant economic para-
digm. Above all, the economic crisis of recent years has highlighted that, in the field
of political economy more than elsewhere, the relationship between mainstream and
alternative paradigms raises important issues regarding the sociology of knowledge
(Lawson 2009; Dobusch and Kapeller 2012; Rochon and Docherty 2012), which seem
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to reflect not only the internal power structures of academic institutions but also the pre-
vailing view in the political arena. In other words, in the field of political economy, the
choice between alternative paradigms also occurs in the light of their correspondence to
politically prevalent interests, and not only on the basis of their theoretical and empirical
robustness. Young Blanchard wanted to change the world with his own intellectual
engagement, but the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they
are right and when they are wrong, seem to be less powerful in relation to and more
dependent on the social context than is commonly understood.
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